Abstract. Assuming w is the only measurable cardinal, we prove:
0. Introduction. This paper is concerned with the following problem: what can we say about the inverse of the map taking logic L into L-elementary equivalence =¡?. We shall derive invertibility results in case L satisfies Robinson's consistency theorem. In studying the interrelations between logics and equivalence relations on structures, the notion of Robinson's consistency has many applications (see [Mu2] ): on one hand, any logic L in which Stc¿(r) is a set satisfies Robinson's consistency theorem iff L is compact and satisfies Craig's interpolation theorem, by a result due to the present author and, independently, to Makowsky and Shelah (see [Mu3] and [MSI] ); on the other hand, Robinson's consistency only depends on =¿ rather than on L, and =¿ has a simpler structure: in fact, Robinson's consistency has a very neat algebraic characterization in terms of amalgamation and joint embedding properties (see [Mu3] and [Mu6] ); furthermore, one can relativize this notion to equivalence relations on smaller classes of structures: thus, for instance, in [Mul] it is proved that on the class of countable structures of finite type there are just two nonpathological equivalence relations satisfying Robinson's consistency, namely s and = ; in the light of the above-mentioned equivalence "Robinson = Craig + Compactness", this might be also regarded as a partial answer to H. Friedman's fourth problem in [Fr] of finding proper extensions of first-order logic still satisfying compactness and interpolation. Concerning Friedman's third problem, too, the techniques developed in [Mu5] for the study of Robinson's consistency in infinitary logics yield such results as "no logic L strictly between Lxu and Lxa0 obeys Craig's interpolation, or Robinson's consistency, unless =L = s (in which case Friedman's problem is still open)".
With the exception of the result in [Mul] , all the above-mentioned results depend on such special set-theoretical hypotheses as -,0* or -,LM (there is no inner model with an uncountable measurable cardinal); incidentally, this gives an idea of the sensitivity of soft model theory for pluralism in set theory. Also the main results of this paper depend (as far as the author can see) on the following assumption: w is the only measurable cardinal.
Hoping that the above discussion has convinced some readers that assuming Robinson's consistency is not an arbitrary restriction, if ~ is an equivalence relation on the class of all structures, we say that ~ is representable iff ~ = =L, for some logic L; =/. satisfies Robinson's consistency theorem iff L does; this is faithfully generalized to the case of an arbitrary equivalence relation ~ , called for short a Robinson equivalence relation. (See Definition 1.1.)
Our first main result (Theorem 3.1) states that for any representable Robinson equivalence relation ~ = =/. with L < L* and L* arbitrary, there is a strongest logic L+ =£ L* such that =/,+ =~ ; in addition, L+ (hence any weaker logic than L+ still representing ~) is countably compact if s =£ ~ .
Thus, although there is no bijection between representable equivalence relations and logics, under the Robinson assumption, a bijection exists if one limits oneself to the strongest logic < L* representing ~ ; notice that the mere existence of a strongest logic is not a trivial fact, in that our notion of a logic incorporates from the very start such features as closure under first-order operations, among which is relativization.
If one considers the case of bounded equivalence relations, i.e. when the equivalence classes of type t form a class having a cardinality (this is the case, e.g., = =L, for a logic L in which Stc^r) is a set) then the inversion problem is completely solved. As a matter of fact, our second main result (Theorem 4.2) states that any bounded representable Robinson equivalence relation ~ is uniquely represented; also, the unique logic L such that =L = ~ is compact and obeys Craig's interpolation.
Thus the function Lt-> =l maps logics satisfying compactness and Craig's interpolation one-one onto representable Robinson equivalence relations (under the abovementioned "boundedness" restriction).
In Corollary 4.4 we prove that only one logic represents elementary equivalence, namely first-order logic (notice that if one only considers representations by compact logics, then the above corollary easily follows from Lindström's theorem (see [Li] or [Fl] ), or even from a "finite cover" argument).
Having solved the uniqueness problem we take up in §5 the problem of the existence of representations of ~ as =¿ for L a logic satisfying compactness and Craig's interpolation. For X a union of equivalence classes of ~ , we let span( A") be the collection of those classes Y which can be obtained from X by repeated applications of the first-order operations; we also let X E hull(~) iff for all Y E span(A"), Y is still a union of equivalence classes of ~ ; we call ~ separable iff License or copyright restrictions may apply to redistribution; see https://www.ams.org/journal-terms-of-use whenever not 9t -58 there is X E hull(~) separating 31 and 33; we prove that (if u is the only measurable cardinal) the following are equivalent: (i) ~ is bounded, separable, Robinson, preserved under reduct, finer than = and coarser than s , and (ii) ~ = =/. for precisely one logic L; in addition, L is compact, obeys interpolation, | StcLT | exists, and each sentence in L is of finite type.
The above representation theorem allows one to give an equivalent algebraic reformulation of Friedman's fourth problem in [Fr] , The author is aware that one of the possible answers to this problem would make his results of § §4 and 5 only applicable to first-order logic and elementary equivalence. Still, he has decided to include these results here, hoping that either (i): Friedman's fourth problem has no such answer, or (ii): if -,(i) holds, still the techniques used in § §4-6 may be of some help to obtain -,(i) itself, or, at least, (iii): no fact implying both -,(i) and -,(ii) occurs before July 14, 1989.
1. Preliminaries. Throughout this paper a, ß,... denote ordinals and k, \, ¡i, v,... denote infinite cardinals; t, t', t" denote sets of sorts and symbols, called types; 91, 33, ®, 90?, 9? denote (many-sorted) structures, whose universes A, B, D, M and A' are always understood to be sets; Str(r) is the class of all structures of type t (compare with [Fe] ); following [MSS] , we let 731 = {33 | 33 ~ 3Í}. A name-changer p: t -» t' is a one-one function from t onto t' taking relation (resp., function) symbols into relation (resp., function) symbols of the same arity; for 31 E Str(r), 31 " is the structure in which each symbol S E t' is interpreted just as p~l(S) is interpreted in 31. We also let t(3í ) be the type of 3f.
A logic L is an ordered pair (StcL,t=L) satisfying the basic axioms of occurrence [Ba] , expansion, renaming, isomorphism and which is closed under the familiar operations of negation, conjunction, quantification, and contains the atomic sentences as in [Fe, ; formulas are sentences with additional constant symbols, as in [Fe, p. 156] , and relativization of formula <p to formula \p(x) is always allowed in our logics, where \¡/(x) is a boolean combination of atomic formulas, and gives formula <p(jcW'<x)', whose semantics is the familiar one, as explained in [Fl] . See also §5.
Notice that all structures and all types are admitted in L, that types need not be finite, that Stcz(T) need not be a set, that in the sentences of L arbitrarily large sets of symbols may occur; if <p E Sicl(t), then we merely say that <p is of type t. 31 =l 33 means that thL 31 = thz 33. K is an elementary class in L of type t iff (K C Str(T) and) K = mod¿ <p for some tp E StcL(r); a structure 31 is characterizable in L by its theory iff 731 = mod¿th¿3t, i.e. iff the structures which are L-elementarily equivalent to 3t are precisely those which are isomorphic to 91. = is elementary equivalence.
An equivalence relation ~ is representable iff ~ = =L for some logic L; given logics L' and L" we write L' < L" iff for each type t and <jd' E Stc¿-(r) there exists <p" E Stc^T) such that modL, <p' = mod,., qp". If L' =£ L" and L" < L' then we simply write L' = L": as a matter of fact, in this case L' and L" have the same expressive power (i.e. the same elementary classes) even if they might differ in the way an elementary class is represented by sentences. When L' < L" we also say that L" is stronger than L'.
We assume the reader is familiar with compact and countably compact logics and with logics obeying Craig's interpolation theorem (see [MS] or [MSS] ). Generalizing a definition in [MS] we say that logic L is K-relatively compact (ic-r.c.) iff for any type t and classes of sentences 2 and T of type t with | 2 | = k, if for each 2' C 2 with | 2' | < k, T U 2' has a model, then T U 2 has a model.
The familiar notion of logic L satisfying Robinson's consistency theorem (see ) is faithfully transposed to the case of an equivalence relation via the following stipulation:
1.1 Definition. Let ~ be an equivalence relation on the class of all structures; then ~ has the Robinson property (or, ~ is a Robinson equivalence relation) iff V9JÍ E Str(r'), V9t E Str(r"), if t = t' n t" and W r r ~ 9c r t, then 3® E Str(r' U t") such that ®ri"'~9K
and e£>\r"~3l. Logic L has the Robinson property (or, L is a Robinson logic) iff L satisfies Robinson's consistency theorem, i.e., iff =l is a Robinson equivalence relation. (Compare with [Mul] .) Notice that r, t' and t" need not all have the same set of sorts.
The importance of Robinson logics and equivalence relations is evident from (but see also [MS, postscriptum] and [MSI] ); further nice properties are given by the results in this paper.
2. The union of Robinson logics.
Proposition.
Let {L¡}ieI be a class of logics; let L = U ie¡L¡ be their union, i.e. the weakest logic which is stronger than each L¡; then for any t and <p E StcL(T), <p has the same models as \p, where (p\,...,9pi;...;^x,...,<f/p¡) where each Qz is either 3 or V (depending on z), B is a boolean combination of a finite number of sentences (depending on <p) of type t U {xx,... ,xn} and any two <p's having the same upper index belong to the same L¡. Conversely, each \¡/ as given by ( + ) is equivalent to a sentence in L.
Proof. Clearly, for any ip given by ( + ) above there must be in L some sentence equivalent to \¡/, as L is closed under the boolean operations and quantification by 3 and V. Thus we have only to show that the class of sentences given by ( + ) is closed under the boolean operations, existential quantification and relativization; as a matter of fact, closure under 3 is trivial; closure under boolean operations and relativization may be proved in a tedious but straightforward way by induction on the complexity of the prefix in ( + ), upon recalling the usual (high school) gymnastics about pushing quantifiers to the left. Q.E.D. Proof. Deny (absurdum hypothesis); expand 31 to 3i+ by adding new n-ary relation symbols Ux,...,Up;...;Ux,...,Upk which are interpreted in model 31+ by
for any y = \,...,k and i = 1,... ,p¡. Then from 31 \=L <p we get
owletîJc =z.,3t+; then (3) 2Jc=í73í+ for any y'= 1, ...,k by hypothesis; hence we get from (1) and (3):
for any y = l,...,k and i = 1,... ,py, by (2) and definition of 3JÎ we get
and from (5) and (4) we finally have (6) 2JcnlV.
This shows that modL th¿ 31+ ÇmodL<p (by 2.1 we can safely assume that tp E Sicl(t)). By a similar argument, if we expand 23, where 33 r-L-,(p, to 33+ by adding new n-ary relation symbols Vx,...,Vp then we get modL th¿ 33+ Ç mod¿-,rjp. Now by noting that the common symbols of 3i+ and 33 + are in t, and by applying Robinson's consistency theorem to Lx, one concludes that 91 and 33 are not L |-elementarily equivalent, a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Let {L¡}¡eJ be a class of Robinson logics such that =/,, = =L.for all i, j E I; let L be their union; then =l = -l¡ for all i E I and, in particular, L is still a Robinson logic.
Proof. Each sentence in L is given (up to equivalence) by ( + ) in 2.1 ; now no such sentence can "separate" two structures 31 and 33 with 31 =l: 33, by Proposition 2.2; this shows that =l= =l,; the fact that L is still a Robinson logic now immediately follows by noting that this only depends on =/.. Q.E.D.
2.4 Remark. In the following sections we shall study the uniqueness and the existence problems for representations of equivalence relation ~ as =L, with L a logic. We shall consider both the infinitary case ( §3) and the case when | Stc¿ t | exists for any t ( § §4-6); for this latter case we shall obtain a complete solution of the representation problem in Theorem 5.5 below. Proof. The existence of a strongest logic L+ follows from the representability of and from Proposition 2.3, letting L+ = union of the logics L" < L* with =L" = ~ ; for the proof of the second part of the theorem we prepare:
3.2 Lemma. Let v be an arbitrary but fixed infinite cardinal; let Lbe a Robinson logic which is not K-r.c. for all k < v; then every single-sorted structure 91 with \ A |< v is characterizable by its theory in L.
Proof of 3.2. See [Mu5, Corollary 4.2]; alternatively, extend up to v the constructions given by [Mu2, 2.1, 1.6, 1.2], which can be done in a straightforward manner. Notice that only relativization to atomic formulas is used in [Mu2] and [Mu5] .
Lemma. (Assuming w is the only measurable cardinal): if L is a Robinson logic
which is not countably compact, or which is not u-r.c, then every single-sorted structure is characterizable by its theory in L.
Proof of 3.3. In view of Lemma 3.2 above, it suffices to prove that L is not K-r.c. for each cardinal k> u.lf not (absurdum hypothesis) let p be the least cardinal such that L is p-r.c; notice that p > co since otherwise L would also be countably compact (letting T = 0 in the definition of K-r.c.) thus contradicting our assumptions. By Lemma 3.2 each ordinal ß < p is characterizable in its theory in type {<} with < a binary relation symbol. Define a single-sorted type t by t= {<,cß,Ps,fg} tor&\lß<n,sE<$(p),ge<i(i, where l.'P denotes power set and the c's, the F's and the/'s are constant, unary relation and unary function symbols, respectively. Let 9JÎ E Str(T) be defined by 3»r {<,<>},<"= <m.<.0W %JltPs(cp) iff ßE s, for each ß<n,s E <3>(p), Wtfg(ca) = cp iff g(a) = ß, for each a, ß<p, g: p -> p.
Let T = thz 9JÍ and 2={c>ca|a<p} with c a new constant symbol; since F is p-r.c. then T U 2 is consistent; so let 9J?+ r-T U 2 (we drop subscript L since no confusion may arise). Without loss of generality we also assume that (1) 2w<t""aw+7
i.e. 9JÎ is an elementary substructure of 2)?+ . Compare with [MS, 6.4(h) ] and [MSI, 2.6].
Let D C i?(p) be given by (2) dED iff im+^Pd(c), fordE 9(n).
Roughly, the elements of D are the restrictions on p of the subsets of the universe of 9JÎ+ having a "name" in 9JÎ and to which c belongs (in 9Jc + ). One sees that D is a nonprincipal ultrafilter on p, by using (1) and (2); we propose to show that D is p-complete, thus contradicting our set-theoretical assumption. If not, D is À-descendingly incomplete for some \<p (see [CK, Exercise 4.3.10(iii) 
Va < A, 9JfM(c) >ca, as ï»c+tFa+1 (c) by (2);
(11) C\da*0.
Thus D is indeed p-complete and p is measurable > co, a contradiction with our set-theoretical hypothesis. In definitive, we conclude that L is never K-r.c. Q.E.D.
3.4 Lemma. Let L be a Robinson logic in which each single-sorted structure is characterizable up to isomorphism by its theory; then each (many-sorted) structure is characterizable up to isomorphism by its theory in L.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Deny (absurdum hypothesis); so let 9Jc and 9Î be two many-sorted structures of type t with 9JÎ =/. 9Î but 9Jc 9*9?. Add a new unary relation symbol Us for each sort s E t; recall that t is a set; represent 9JÍ as a one-sorted structure 9Jc" by letting universe of 9JÏ ' = union of the universes of the sorts of 9JÍ, Uf1' = universe of sort í in 9JÎ (for any sort s E r).
For simplicity assume t has no function symbol; let is be the identity map from the universe of sort s in 9JÍ onto U™'; let i = U jgT is; let the symbols of t be interpreted in 9JÍ ' according to the canonical relativization induced by i (see [Mo, p. 484] for a similar construction); also assume that each R E t is written R' in 9JÎ': let t' be the set of primed symbols thus obtained. Roughly, i induces a one-sorted photograph 9Jc" of the many-sorted structure Tl. Similarly, let 9Í" be a one-sorted representation of 92 induced by function y, where new unary relation symbols Vs are used to relativize sort s and each R E t is written as R" in 9c": let t" be the set of doubly primed symbols thus obtained. Let p be a name-changer which maps each R' E t' into R" E t" and maps each Us into Vs; let (SSl'Y be the structure canonically obtained from 9JÍ' via p; notice that (1) (9Jc')Ps*9r as 9Jc s* 9Î ; thus, by hypothesis about L applied to the single-sorted structures 9J? '
and SSI", we get (2) (WY^lSSI". Let now 9Í = <9Jc, W, i) and 23 = (9c, 9c", j) . Recalling that 9JÍ =L 9c, by the assumed Robinson consistency theorem for L there exists 25 which is both Lequivalent to 91 and to 33, hence, in particular (by the basic expansion axiom of logics),
H\r'=LW and ^\t"=lSSI".
Therefore, by the renaming axiom of logics and by (2) we can write
hence, by the isomorphism axiom logics, we have
Now look at 3D p t: ; and y induce two one-sorted representations of 25 \ t which we write as ;(2)r t) and y'(2)f t), respectively, of type t' and t"; since i and j are structure-preserving, then we have (6) (,-(®rT))pSy(2>rT).
In view of the fact that ;(2) \ r) -2) \ r' and y'(25 (■ t) = 2) [ r", we finally see that (5) and (6) contradict each other. Q.E.D.
3.5 End of the proof. Let L+ be the strongest logic such that = ¿.+ = ~ ; if L+ is not countably compact, then by 3.3 and 3.4 it follows that each structure is characterizable in L+ by its theory, i.e. = /.+ = s . Q.E.D.1 3.6 Corollary.
(Assuming co is the only measurable cardinal): Let ~ be a representable Robinson equivalence relation; then the following are equivalent:
(i) ~ characterizes (co, < >, i.e. /(«, < )= {9? | 9c ~ (co, < >}; (ii) ~ characterizes every structure, viz. ~ = s .
Proof, (ii) -» (i) is trivial; to prove the converse, letting L be such that ~ = =¿, we immediately see that L cannot be co-r.c. (by a familiar argument which can be found, among others, in [MS] ); therefore, by 3.3 and 3.4 we have that = = ~ .
3.7 Remark. Compare with [Mu4, Theorem 4] , which essentially proves the above corollary upon restriction to countable structures only.
'Matt Kaufmann has given a simple proof of a many-sorted version of 3.2, thus eliminating 3.4 from the proof of 3.1. He also posed the problem whether one can find a counterexample to 3.1 if it is no longer assumed that ~ is Robinson. He finally remarked that from [MSI, 5.8, 5.9] one can see that some large cardinal hypothesis is actually necessary for Theorem 3.1 above to hold. 4. A duality theorem. Theorem 3.1 can be further improved if we assume that h as not too many equivalence classes of structures of type t; more precisely, we stipulate:
4.1 Definition. We say that an equivalence relation ~ on the class of all structures is bounded iff for any type t the collection of the equivalence classes of structures of type t is equinumerous with some cardinal kt.
In other words, ~ is bounded iff for every type t there is a set Sr E Str(r) such that V9I E Str(x)333 E ST with 33 ~ 31. Compare with [Na] ; notice here that our notion of a logic incorporates from the start closure under first-order operations, including relativization. For bounded equivalence relations we have the following:
4.2 Theorem (Assuming co is the only measurable cardinal): Let ~ be a bounded Robinson equivalence relation; assume =z/ =~ = =l"', then L' = L" and both are compact logics obeying Craig's interpolation.
Proof. First notice that since ~ is bounded, then for any type t the collection of elementary classes of type t in U is equinumerous with a set GT; also, L' satisfies Robinson's consistency theorem as so does =u. Therefore we can apply the corollary to the main theorem in [Mu3] , to the effect that L' is compact and obeys Craig's interpolation; the same applies to L"; let L -L' U L"; for each t, in L the elementary classes of type t are equinumerous with a set HT, by Proposition 2.1, and =l = =¿-, by Proposition 2.3, so that L satisfies Robinson's consistency theorem as well; again by applying the corollary to the main theorem in [Mu3] , we see that L is compact; now, since L > L', by a familiar (finite cover) argument found, e.g., in [Fl] , we have that L -L' (notice that here one needs the fact that the collection of elementary classes in L' of type t is equinumerous with a set, in order to be able to exploit compactness); similarly, L = L". Notice that in [Mu3] only relativization to atomic formulas is actually used. Q.E.D.
4.3 Remarks. The boundedness assumption is clearly necessary: consider, for instance, Lxao and any logic stronger than it. The assumption that co is the only measurable cardinal is used for the proof of the results in [Mu3] on which the proof of 4.2 depends.
By the above theorem we see that the function L h> = /, maps the class of all logics satisfying Robinson's consistency and having a bounded number of sentences (mod equivalence) in every type, one-one onto the class of all the representable bounded Robinson equivalence relations (assuming co is the only measurable cardinal). In the next section we shall give a necessary and sufficient condition for an equivalence relation to be representable by some logic L satisfying compactness and Craig's interpolation.
In this sense, one will be then able to speak of a "duality" between logics and equivalence relations.
Corollary.
(Assuming co is the only measurable cardinal): There exists just one logic L such that = ¡, -= , namely first-order logic.
Proof. = is representable (e.g., via first-order logic Lua); further, = is a Robinson equivalence relation, by the familiar Robinson's consistency theorem in first-order logic (see [CK] ); finally, = is bounded, as can be immediately seen by considering that | Stc¿ (t) | = | t U co |. Now apply Theorem 4.2. Q.E.D.
4.5 Remark. One can see without difficulty that the (generalized downward) Löwenheim-Skolem theorem together with Lindström's theorem (see [Li] or [Fl] ) directly yield that Lww is the only compact logic L such that =L-= (one might even use a simpler "finite cover" argument). Also notice that the collection of all unions of classes of elementarily equivalent structures of type t, with t arbitrary, does not give (the elementary classes of) a logic, since it is not closed under existential quantification; if one attempts to close this collection under all the first-order operations, the resulting logic L' has =/.-¥= = .
5. Characterizing representability. In this section we shall state the characterization theorem for those equivalence relations ~ which are equal to =¿ for some compact logic L obeying Craig's interpolation. The proof will be given in the next section. For our characterization we shall need to construct logic F representing ~ : to get such L one first studies a system of classes of structures which is closed under all the first-order operations and which is, in some sense, generated by ~ ; the necessary set up is given by the following discussion.
A finite-type class X is an ordered pair X = (S, t) where t is a finite type and S Ç Str(T); we naturally say that X is elementary iff 5 = mod <p for some first-order sentence tp of type t; we incorporate t in the definition of X so that we can unambiguously speak of the type of X, for short t(X): actually this becomes critical only for classes of the form X = ( 0, t ). In any case we shall freely write 9t E X to mean 91 E S.
For p: t -» p(r) a name-changer, p acts on X yielding pX of type p(t) defined by 91 EpX iff 91" ' EX.
Given X= (S,t), the negation of X is -,X = (Str(r) \5, t); for Xx= (Sx,tx) and X2 = (S2, t2), the conjunction Xx A X2 is given by 91 E A', A X2 iff 31 E Str(t, U t2) and 91 r t, E Xx and 91 r t2 E X2.
The disjunction Xx V X2 is defined as -,(-.A", A ->X2), and is a finite-type class of typer, U t2.
For b a constant symbol and X = (S, t), the projector 3b transforms X into 3bX of type t \ {b} given by 31 E3bX iff 91 E Str t \ {b} and 31 has an expansion 31+ E X.
We also let V/3A* be defined as -,36-,X. A prenex function Qxkx... Q"kn, for short Q ° k, where each Qt is either 3 or V, depending on /', and each k¡ is a constant symbol, transforms X into Q ° kX given by QokX=Qxkx(...(QnknX)...).
We now consider relativization: in the single-sorted case, see [Fl] , the notion of 31 being T-closed upon restriction to {x\ U(x)} means that in St: (i) U(x) has some solution, (ii) each constant of r satisfies U(x), and (iii) the output of each function symbol/E t satisfies U(x) whenever (each component of) its input does. Also, the models of the relativization <pu of sentence <p of type t to {x \ U(x)} are the structures of type t U {U} which are r-closed upon restriction to {x \ U(x)} and such that 911 {x \ U(x)} is a model of <p. Notice that we incorporate r-closure in the definition of relativization.
The above is naturally generalized to the many-sorted case as follows: let t be a finite type with sorts sx,...,s2; let x = x\... ,xz be a sequence of constants, respectively, of sorts sx,... ,sz; let \p -\px,... ,\p, be a sequence where each <//, is a boolean combination of atomic sentences and is of type t, containing x'. Then the class Proof. By a tedious but direct application of the definitions. Q.E.D. Having defined the first-order operations on classes of structures, we shall now define the first-order span of class X: intuitively, the latter is the collection of all finite-type classes one can obtain from X by repeated applications of the first-order operations; in fact, it is not hard to see that our definition describes the smallest such system. 5.2 Definition. If X is any finite-type class of type t, then uve first-order span of X, for short span( X), is the collection of all finite-type classes Y of the form Y=QokB((pxX){^\...,(prXf^],Ex,...,Ep)
where Q°k -Qxkx.. .Qnkn is a prenex function, B a boolean function, Ex,...,Ep are elementary classes, each p, is a name-changer with domain t, each x¡ = x),... ,x: is a sequence of constants, one for each sort of p,(t), and each ^ = \f>jX.. .\piz is a sequence where ^ -, of type 7¡¡ D {x{}, is a boolean combination of atomic sentences.
Notice that X E span(X). We shall try to sketch now the key ideas to represent an equivalence relation ~ as =l for some logic L: one naturally looks for L-elementary classes among finite-type classes X such that VF E span(J*0, T is a union of equivalence classes of ~ , since, if 9J? ~ SSI then Y cannot separate S)Sl and SSI. One also needs as many as possible such classes X, so that whenever not 9JÍ ~ SSI some X actually separates SSR and 31; one then hopes that the system thus obtained is closed under A and 3. We shall see in our main theorem below that this is indeed the case for Robinson equivalence relations satisfying some additional regularity conditions. Let us now make precise the above discussion: 5.3 Definition. For ~ a bounded equivalence relation (see §4) on the class of all structures, the hull of ~ , for short hull(~) is defined by X E hull( ~) iff X is a finite-type class and each Y in span( X) is a union of equivalence classes of ~ .
Thus, if X E hull(~), A" does not separate SSSl, SSI if SSI [ r(X) ~ SSJl r t(X), i.e. it is not the case that 9c [ r(X) E X and 9Jf r t(X) E X, and this property is inherited by all Y E span(A'). Notice that if ~ is finer than = , i.e. 91 ~ 23 implies 91 = 23, then each elementary class F is automatically in hull(~).
5.4 Definition. A bounded equivalence relation ~ is separable iff for each (possibly infinite) type t and 9Í, 23 E Str(T), if not 91 -33 then there exists t0 finite Ç t and X E hull(~) such that 31 r t0 E Xand 33 r t0 E X.
Thus in a separable equivalence relation any two nonequivalent structures can be separated by some X in the hull; notice that if ~ is preserved under reduct, i.e.
SSJl ~ SSI implies SDÎ r t ~ 9c r t, then from 9Í r t0 E Xand 33 r t0 E AT with X E hull(~) one can infer not 91 -93.
We are now ready to state our main representation theorem for equivalence relations on structures:
5.5 Theorem. (Assuming co is the only measurable cardinal): For ~ an arbitrary equivalence relation the following are equivalent:
(a) ~ is bounded, separable, Robinson, preserved under reduct, finer than = and coarser than s ; (b) ~ = =hfor some compact logic L obeying Craig's interpolation, with StC/(r) having a cardinality | StcL(r) | for any t, and each sentence being of finite type; (c) ~ = =l for precisely one logic L; in addition, L is compact, obeys Craig's interpolation, | StcL(T) | exists for any r, and each sentence in L is of finite type.
The proof is given in the next section.
6. Proof of the representation theorem. The proof that (c) implies (b) is trivial. We now prove that (b) implies (a): assume ~ = =/. with L satisfying the hypotheses of (b); then ~ is bounded, as | StcL t | exists for all t; ~ is Robinson, since the assumed properties of L are well known to imply that F satisfies Robinson's consistency theorem; ~ is preserved under reduct, by the expansion axiom satisfied by L; ~ is finer than elementary equivalence = , since L > LUüJ, and is coarser than s by the isomorphism axiom satisfied by L. We finally prove that ~ is separable: as a matter of fact, let 91, 23 E Str(T); assume not-9Í ~ 23, i.e. 91 z¿ 23; then for some sentence <p E StcL(r) we have 91 t=L <p and 23 t=z -,<p; since <p is of finite type, then for some finite t0 C t, <p E Sicz(t0) and, by the expansion axiom satisfied by L, we have that 9íCT0t=¿<p and 23 f r0i=¿-,<p. Now notice that the finite-type class X = (modz tp, t0) is in hull(~), since for each Y E span( A") there exists a sentence aY E StcL(T(T)) such that Y = (mod¿ aY, t(Y)); this is a consequence of L being closed under the first-order operations. Therefore, Y is a union of equivalence classes of ~ and AÏEhull(~)) indeed separates 91 and 23, so that ~ is separable as required. This completes the proof that (b) implies (a).
To prove that (a) implies (c), we first establish the closure properties of hull(~) in the following Lemmas 6.1-6.7: we assume throughout that ~ satisfies the conditions in (a).
6.1 Lemma. If X is elementary, then X E hull(~).
Proof. Otherwise (absurdum hypothesis) 3Y E span^) which is not a union of equivalence classes of ~ , where Y is as in Definition 5.2; notice that each (PjX)^'^^ is elementary, hence so is Y; therefore F is a union of equivalence classes of = , hence a union of equivalence classes of ~ , since ~ is finer than = ; we have thus a contradiction from the hypothesis that X E hull(~).
6.2 Lemma. If X E hull(~) then X is a union of isomorphism classes, i.e. for any SSSl, SSI with S0l=SSl,Sm EX iffSii E X.
Proof. A" is a union of equivalence classes of ~ and ~ is coarser than s .
6.3 Lemma. If X E hull(~), p is a name-changer and Z = p(X), then Z E hull(~). ) with F, elementary, by 5.1(i), so that YE s\oan(X), too, hence F is a union of equivalence classes of ~ since X E hull(~).
6.5 Lemma. Assume that X E hull(~) and X is of finite type r; let y = y\... ,yz, respectively, of sort sx,... ,sz, the latter being precisely the sorts ofr,let(p = (px,...,(pz be a sequence where each <p, is a boolean combination of atomic sentences, of type t, D {y'}; assume Z = X{^; then Z E hull(~). Let 9t be arbitrary, with 9Í ~ 9J?+ ; then the fact that ~ is finer than = , together with (6) implies (7) %EQokB'(Uxk,...,Umk);
as a matter of fact, the class in (6) or (7) is elementary. Since F is a union of equivalence classes of ~ , by (4) we also have (8) 91 E F. Hence, by (1), (2), (3), (7) and (8) we have (9) 9irr(99?)EF.
By similarly expanding SSI E E via relation symbols Vx,...,Vm one gets, for any 23 ~ 9?+ , where 9?+ is the expanded structure thus obtained, (10) 33rT(9?)<2F. Hence, there is no 25 such that 25 r t(9J?+ ) ~ 9J?+ and 25 r r(SSl + ) ~ 9?+ , since otherwise 2)f t(9J?) is both in F and in -,F by (9) and (10), which is impossible.
Applying now the assumed Robinson property of ~ , we obtain that not 9J? ~ 9?, thus contradicting our assumption about 9J? and 9?.
6.7 Lemma. If X E hull(~), h is a constant and Z = 3hX, then Z E hull(~). where we assume without loss of generality that h' ¥=kx,...,kn. Add to t(9J?) r H-ary relation symbols Uxk,...,Urk and let F¡ be given by (recall 6.6 above for the meaning of U¡k as a fini te-type class): By similarly expanding 9? £ E to 9?+ via relation symbols Vx,...,Vr one gets, for any33~9?+, (11) 23rT(9?)EF.
Hence, there exists no 25 such that 2) r t(9J?+ ) ~ 99?+ and 2) [ t(9?+ ) ~ 9?+ since otherwise, 25rr(9J?) EF and E -,E by (10) and (11), which is impossible. By applying now the assumed Robinson property of ~ , we finally have that not 99? ~ 9?, a contradiction. 6.8 End of the proof of the theorem. Having proved that hull(~) is closed under the first-order operations, we define L = (Stc¿, t=¿) as follows: ( + ) <p E StcL(r) iff cp E hull(~) and has typei-(<p) C t, and, for 31 E Str(-r), (++) 3l>L<p iffcp E Sicl(t) and 9lrT(<p)E<p.
We have the following. Claim 1. L is a logic. Proof. Directly from the above definition, together with our assumptions about and Lemmas 6.1-6.7; notice that we have not used separability and the special set-theoretical assumption. Proof. The last two conclusions easily follow from ~ being bounded and from the definition of L; L is a Robinson logic by Claim 2, since ~ is Robinson; now, from the corollary to the main result in [Mu3] , L is compact and obeys Craig's interpolation theorem. Notice that in [Mu3] only relativization to atomic sentences is used, so that the results therein may be safely applied to the logics considered in this paper, where (many-sorted) relativization is to boolean combinations of atomic sentences.
Claim 4. L is the unique logic such that =L = ~ . Proof. Let L" be a logic such that =¿-= ~ = =L; then the desired conclusion follows from Theorem 4.2 above.
The proof of Claim 4 concludes the proof of our representation theorem. Q.E.D. 6.9 Remark. The assumption that co is the only measurable cardinal is needed for the proof (of the results in [Mu3] implying) that (a) => (c) in 5.5.
As Matt Kaufmann pointed out, in view of a theorem of Friedman [MSI, 4.1] one can delete the hypothesis that each sentence is of finite type in the proof that (b) =* (a) in 5.5.
6.10 Remarks. Notice that if one drops the separability assumption on ~ , one still gets from ~ a logic L via definitions ( + ) and (+ +) in 6.9 above, and L is the strongest logic with =l coarser than ~ , and in which every sentence is of finite type. Also notice that the unique logic L given by our representation theorem has many other properties in common with first-order logic, e.g., all the familiar interpolation and definability properties, joint embedding, amalgamation, and L has a Löwenheim number (see [Mu3] ); in addition for each sentence <p in L there is a smallest finite type t such that tp E Sicl(t), so that L automatically satisfies Barwise's "finite occurrence" axiom (see [Ba, pp. 234, 254] ). If one restricts attention to logics satisfying such axiom and whose sentences of any given type are equinumerous with a set then (assuming co is the only measurable cardinal) Friedman's fourth problem in [Fr] can be given the following equivalent algebraic reformulation:
"Find a bounded separable Robinson equivalence relation which is preserved under reduct, strictly finer than = and coarser than s ."
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Matt Kaufmann.
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